ter PLASTICITY]). As many have noted, these works rely upon a philosophy fundamentally different from Unger's earlier works, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975) 10. Throughout this Note, "social meaning" refers to the contextual meaning of the full range of sible of social life. Two dimensions of this theory are important for the argument of this Note, "contextuality"" 1 and "constructivism."" 2 In the sections that follow, these dimensions are sketched."
A. Contextuality
It is commonplace that a sentence has meaning by virtue of its use within a context of understanding or expectation,' 4 and a small step from social artifacts, conveyed by their role in social life. This population includes obvious meaningartifacts, such as language and gesture, as well as others less obvious, such as legal concepts, modes of production, institutions, and governments. See infra note 15 (discussing tokens).
11. Contextuality is a motif running through a wide range of theorists, both in philosophy, see generally R. RORTY 12. Like contextuality, constructivism refers to no school in particular, but rather to a theme regarding the nature of social meaning. That our social world is constructed is not a new idea. For its chief modern pronouncement, see P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 49 (1967) ("While it is possible to say that man has a nature, it is more significant to say that man constructs his own nature, or more simply, that man produces himself."). See also D. BLOOR, WITTGENSTEIN: A SOCIAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (1983); C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRE-TATION OF CULTURES, supra note 11, at 5 (" [M] an is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun. . . ."); N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 7 (1978) ("With false hope of a firm foundation gone, with the world displaced by worlds that are but versions, with substance dissolved into function, and with the given acknowledged as taken, we face the questions how worlds are made, tested, and known."); R. RORTY, supra note 11, at xxxix ("Can we see ourselves as never encountering reality except under a chosen description . . . making worlds rather than finding them?"); J. 13. While the picture which will emerge is of necessity only a caricature of a theory far more complex, this sketch will suffice for the arguments that follow. The theory of meaning outlined below simplifies along at least two dimensions. First, the theory ignores the role of the interpreter; second, it ignores problems of indeterminacy in meaning. See S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 1-17, 147-73 (1980) . These issues are crucial to any fully developed understanding of meaning, but must be bypassed for the purposes of this Note.
14. See L. WITTGENSTEIN Meaning is a function of both token and context.' 7 Two aspects of this "contextuality" are relevant to this Note.
The first aspect is the core nature of "context" itself. A context is composed of structures of understanding,"" a scaffolding within which concepts exist.' 9 Meaning is conditioned upon context, and thus conditioned 2 " upon the structures that compose this context. These structures, often invisible to ordinary analysis, 2 " include the full range of patterned expectations and understandings, from styles of fashion, to norms of etiquette, to conventions of speech, to rules of law.
2 2 They infect every activity, "secrete" 2 their own norms. Together they make up the status quo, 2 to be justified if the status quo is to be justified. 2 5 Contextuality teaches us to 15 . "Token" refers to a symbol of meaning: a statement, a wink, an institution, a practice, an action, an inaction. Under this broad understanding, then, token can refer either to the literal words of a text, for example, or, in the context of a statute, to the application of those words in the particular context. This distinction, between the words and their application, will be crucial below. focus upon these structures, to understand their nature so as to understand the nature of the meaning they permit. 2 "
The second aspect of contextuality relevant to this Note is the method of analysis contextuality suggests. Since meaning is a function of both token and context, 27 an analysis of meaning must include an account of each. A change in either can affect meaning; therefore, the meaning of a token is not necessarily preserved simply by keeping the token unchanged. Between two moments of time, contextuality tutors us to track both the change in the token and the change in the context, so as to track the change in meaning.
Ackerman and Unger embrace both aspects of contextuality, and are guided by contextuality throughout their work. 2 Contextuality is the first aspect of a theory of meaning the rivals share.
B. Constructivism
Where contextuality identifies the components of social meaning, constructivism 29 teaches that each element is (at least potentially) under social control: We can change both the tokens of social meaning and the structures that give these tokens their meaning. No structure or routine of social life is either natural or necessary; 3 0 each is an artifact, 1 28. "The contextual quality of thought is a brute fact." SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 19. "Al[t]hough we can transcend our contexts, we cannot pursue any of our ordinary human concerns outside a context." FALSE NEcEssrrY, supra note 3, at 433. Any meaningful activity or thought is contextual; context is enabling, since constituting all meaningful human activity, but also constraining. PASSION, supra note 6, at 4.
In 29. Contextuality by itself does not imply constructivism. Other theories have identified structures guiding social life and evolution without suggesting these structures were amenable to human control. Unger identifies two, which he calls naturalism and deep structure (or deep logic) theories. See PAS-SION, supra note 6, at 5-6; SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 23-24, 84-87 (discussing naturalism), 88-96 (discussing deep structure theories).
30. See SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 164 (on naturalness of family); S. LOVIBOND, supra
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 98: 1173 ated and socially changed. No superstructure guides social evolution, or at least none that we could not ultimately transform. 2 To deny constructivism is to betray what Unger calls "false necessity." False necessity is "the ease with which we mistake the constraints imposed by a particular formative context of social life for the inherently psychological, organizational, and economic imperatives of society." 3 3 By revealing the nature of context and constraint,"' constructivism uncovers the means by which constraint is remade and context overcome. 35 The theme of constructivism, then, is the artificial, socially-made, and possible of social life. 3 6 Both Ackerman and Unger embrace constructivism," 7 however differently they may develop it.
note 11, at 118 (organic connection of language with culture); id. at 117 (Wittgensteinian conception means linguistic world not natural phenomenon, but "a product of our own actions"); id. at 119 (subject only to the constraint of community, "nothing constrains our choice of ... what linguistic systems to maintain"); SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 145 ("They want to deprive these frameworks or contexts of their aura of higher necessity or authority. Above all, they want to affirm that things can be otherwise.").
31. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 61 (" [Contexts] are artifacts, and makeshift ones at that, but they are not just factitious entities that cease to exist as soon as people stop taking them seriously."); see also SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 1 (modern social thought viewing society as human artifact); J. 34. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 254-55 (discussing the source of conceptions of necessity). However, to deny that constraints are inherent in a particular form of life is not to deny that there are constraints on social life. See, e.g., id. at 195.
35. But that contexts and constraint can be remade does not mean that they can be changed all at once. "Inevitably, we must accept a conservative presumption." PASSION, supra note 6, at 42. Revolutionary reform is necessarily conservative, S. LovIBOND, supra note 11, at 109 ("[Ilf we throw out too much of our intellectual furniture at once, we cease to have a habitable world-view . . ."), taking something as given, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 18, changing structures only piece by piece. See id. at 4, 158; FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 4, 559 (only if proceed step by step); Ball, The City of Unger, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 625, 630 (1987) ("We can unbolt the pieces of our contexts and replace them one at a time."); cf. L. WITrTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY, supra note 11, T 343 ("We just can't investigate everything. . . . If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.").
36. "At any given time we are largely the sum of our fundamental practices. But we are also the permanent possibility of revising them." PASSION, supra note 6, at 41 (emphasis in original); FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 351 (same).
37. See, e.g., supra notes 29-36; RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 5, at 4 (constructing new form of power discourse); SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 333 (constructing new form of liberal discourse); SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 148 ("approach allows for a piece-by-piece reconstruction of social frameworks."); Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986 DUKE L.J. 929, 946 (constructing new form of legal discourse).
II. CONFLICT
A theory of social meaning links Ackerman to Unger, Unger to Ackerman. But an aspect of that theory still divides: plasticity. While Unger exhorts us to "plastify" society by making its structures more easily transformed, Ackerman counsels us to resist. The scope of this conflict is explored below.
A. Unger: Plasticity
Social structures, Unger suggests, differ in at least two ways: They differ, first, in the content of the social world they induce, and second, in the ease with which they can be changed. 3 Plasticity describes this latter dimension. A plastic society minimizes the difference between acting upon and acting within a social structure, 39 "soften[ing] the distinction between quotidian revision within a context and revolutionary revision of the context itself .
",40
The plasticity of a social structure, however, is not itself simply fixed or given; plasticity too can be changed. "We can alter not only the content but the quality of our routines, the sense in which they are routines at all." 41 By creating structures that multiply the instruments of challenge, 4" social structures are transformed from rigid to plastic, expanding the opportunities to transcend and change formative contexts. 4 Unger urges us to act upon this possibility, transforming the rigid into the pliant." 38. Unger calls these dimensions "quality" and "content." See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 4, 14; PASSION, supra note 6, at 192; SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 4, 21, 156, 199.
39. See PASSION, supra note 6, at 13 ("contrast between routine moves within a framework and revolutionary struggle about it loses its force").
40. Weinrib, Enduring Passion (Book Review), 94 YALE L.J. 1825, 1826 (1985). "Quotidian" describes the regular hectic sense of ordinary political conflict and change.
Plasticity does not by itself make a society unstable: "Rigidity is not stability, nor does the increased transparency and revisability of our practices mean we will want constantly to revise them." FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 280. To the contrary, Unger suggests, plasticity means each individual revision is likely to be less dramatic than in a society where structural change has been less frequent. "The more a structure of thought . . . provides for the occasions and instruments of its own revision, the less you must choose between maintaining it and abandoning it for the sake of things it excludes." PASSION, supra note 6, at 10.
41. PASSION, supra note 6, at 192; see also id. at 13 ("[T]he more congenial to permanent innovation an institutional form . . . becomes, the more perfectly it exemplifies the modernist ideal of a context so open to revision that the contrast between routine moves within a framework and revolutionary struggle about it loses its force.").
42. A number of independent grounds are offered for this injunction to plastify. Of these, only one-the special power plasticity promises democracy-is essential here. 4 The promise of plasticity for democracy is this. By "diminishing the gap between framework-preserving and framework-transforming conflict," 46 plastic structures are less entrenched, 4 more easily revised. "Less entrenched and more revisable [structures] help us empower ourselves individually and collectively.' '8 The more empowered a society, the greater the scope for democratic or collective action, and therefore, the greater its capacity to affirm the ends of democratic government.4 9 Plasticity is promoted, then, because it increases the capacity of a society to act democratically.
Unger promotes plasticity, and a familiar interpretation suggests that his patronage is unconditional. 50 But before evaluating the scope of Unger's passion for plasticity, first contrast it with Ackerman's resistance.
B. Ackerman: Dualism
Like Unger, Ackerman recognizes social action both upon and within social structures, 5 ' and would agree that a less entrenched, more plastic society could more easily revise social structures. He would disagree, however, with the notion that the mere fact a society can more easily change itself means that it can change itself more democratically.
It is this concern 5 -that any change be democratic change-that leads Ackerman to resist plasticity. Ackerman argues that plasticity, rather than empowering a democracy, decreases democratic control. 53 45. Unger offers two other grounds for plasticity, both more evolutionary in their underpinnings. The first is tied to Unger's conception of personality. See PASSION, supra note 6, at 95-271. The second is more pragmatic: Plasticity engenders progress, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 578, by assuring the conditions for practical success, id. at 283; SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 5, 155, empowering a people or culture to adjust to the changing conditions of existence. For a historical analysis of the progress provided by plasticity, see PLASTICrrY, supra note 6.
46. FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 362. 47. SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 154 ("The more entrenched a formative context, the greater the number of intermediate steps that must be traversed before context-preserving routines become context-transforming struggles.").
48. Id. at 5. 49. As will be seen below, the desire to empower democratic government is shared by Ackerman and Unger. See DISCOVERING, supra note 5, ch. 2 at I ("My aim is to provide the materials for a revised professional narrative which recognizes that the project of constitutional creation begun in Philadelphia continues onward to the present day."); infra text accompanying notes 51-74.
50. See infra note 114. 51. See, e.g., RECONsTRucrING, supra note 5, at 54. 52. This is also a concern of others. See Ewald, supra note 6, at 733-53 (discussing suggestions of fascism in Unger); Galston, supra note 44, at 759.
53. See Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1038. In Ackerman's terms, a plastic constitutional structure zens keep a constant watch on the "everything up for grabs," 54 at some point factions, 5 5 rather than democrats, will manipulate social power. 56 This fear of faction leads Ackerman to insist upon (some) rigidity for the constituting commitments of a democratic order. 57 Ackerman's concern finds its clearest voice in his discussion of American democracy. 5 8 Drawing heavily upon a dualist theory of democracy, Ackerman distinguishes two kinds, or "tracks," of political action. The first track is the practice of normal politics; ordinary political decisions are made by representative institutions of government acting within existing structures. The second track is constitutional politics, where extraordinary decisions are made by popular bodies acting outside and upon the structures of ordinary government. 5 9 Nothing on the first track can disrupt the second; 6 0 action on the second track 61 represents special moments of rare meaning, "when the American people do even more-when, after sustained debate and struggle, they hammer out new principles to guide public life." 6 2
Dualism is a response to the democrat's desire to assure that changes in the fundamental principles of a constitutional structure represent the will of the people represented. Like Unger, 6 1 Ackerman's dualism responds to and builds upon a feature of the human condition: Citizens, dualism recognizes, ordinarily live for ends beyond the public good; each has her own private life, to which she devotes the majority of her effort. 64 The constitu- 56. Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1022. 57. Id. at 1038. Ackerman's resistance to plasticity is not so clearly pronounced in his other major works, such as SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE, supra note 5. But these works are distinct from the Storrs Lectures, supra note 4, and DISCOVERING, supra note 5; the latter are disciplined more dearly by principles of democracy rather than of liberalism.
58. See DISCOVERING, supra note 5; Ackerman, supra note 4. 59. See Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1039-44. The difference between these kinds of action translated into a difference in the value of each. See DISCOVERING, supra note 5, ch. 2 at 9. 60. Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1039. But see PASSION, supra note 6, at 5 ("[Tlhe acts that reproduce these contexts, in changing circumstances, generate an endless stream of petty conflicts that may escalate at any moment into more fundamental, context-threatening disputes.").
61. Second track politics is, one hopes, characterized "by ... appeals to the common good, ratified by a mobilized mass of American citizens expressing their assent through extraordinary institutional forms." Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1022 (citations omitted). 62. Id. at 1039; see also DISCoVERING, supra note 5, ch. 2 at 50 ("[T]he Constitution cannot be understood without recognizing that Americans have, time and again, successfully repudiated large chunks of their past, and transformed their higher law to express deep changes in their political identities.").
63. See PASSION, supra note 6. 64. See Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1032 (describing world "inhabited by men and women who gain their deepest satisfactions in activities far removed from the public forum.").
tional democrat, therefore, cannot simply assume that public virtue" 5 will guide constitutional change, or that citizens will always focus their attention on the transformative process. Rather than assuming such attention, she must devise structures which engage these private citizens, 66 assuring their participation, and assuring that their participation voices "considered judgment. ' By raising obstacles to structural revision, dualism assures that second track politics prevails only during times of heightened political consciousness. These obstacles raise the stakes for action upon fundamental structures of government, forcing ordinary government to turn outside itself, to the people, for constitutional change. 69 This is the strategy of "differential sacrifice."" By distinguishing ordinary political change from constitutional change, and making the latter more difficult to effect, dualism creates a vocabulary through which challenges to constitutional structures signal their own importance, 7 1 and by so signaling, assure that any such change has the attention of private citizens.
In this way dualism addresses the imperfect ability of a democracy to assure that changes in its fundamental principles represent carefully deliberated and well understood transformations. All the well-known problems of democratic politics, articulated from Madison 72 Unger and Ackerman disagree about whether plasticity should be endorsed; but this disagreement rests upon a confusion, engendered by an ambiguity within the meaning of transformation. Relying upon the understanding of social meaning discussed in Section I, this Section distinguishes between two notions of transformation. These notions relate differently to questions of democratic control: Whether plasticity is advanced should turn upon which sense of transformation is at issue.
A. Translation and Alteration
As discussed above, the meaning of a token is a function of the token and its context. 5 As either token or context changes, meaning may change." If meaning is to be preserved, then, either (a) the changed element must be restored, or (b) the unchanged element must be transformed. Between context and token, assume that the token is generally more easily transformed. 7 Where the context has changed, and the meaning of the token in the new context is different, then the meaning can be preserved by changing the token. 77. The assumption is not required: A counter-example is provided by United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). Earlier lower-court rulings had held a pardon by President Johnson sufficient to show that a claimant was not a supporter of the Confederate rebellion. Congress attempted to change the meaning of that token by altering the rules of decision under which a loyalty oath and pardon were to be read. Under Congress' new rules, a pardon meant the claimant was a supporter of the rebellion. By changing the interpretative context, but for the act of the Court, Congress would have changed the meaning of the token of a pardon.
78. The change in the token can be a change in its words or in its application. This does not imply that meaning can always be preserved. It is possible that the changes are such that the meaning of the token in the old context can no longer survive in the new. Consider Wittgenstein's example:
'It is as if our concepts involved a scaffolding of facts.' That would presumably mean: If you imagine certain facts otherwise, describe them otherwise, than the way they are, then you can no longer imagine the application of certain concepts, because the rules for their application have no analogue in the new circumstances. So what I am saying comes to this: A law is given for human beings, and a jurisprudent may well be capable of drawing consequences for any case that ordinarily comes his way; thus the law evidently has its use, makes sense. Nevertheless, its validity presupposes all sorts of things, and if the being that he is to judge is quite deviant from ordinary human beings, then e.g. the decision whether he has done a deed with evil intent will become not difficult but (simply) impossible. L. WrrTGFNSTEIN, ZETEL, supra note 11, at 350. Justice Jackson made a similar point about the modality of translation in Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States:
We doubt if any interpreter could intelligently translate the contents of a writing that deals with the property concept, for the Indians did not have a word for it. People do not have words
The following examples may help make this point clear.
A mime begs for dimes. A couple walks up, speaking English, and hands her a dime. She raises a sign saying "thanks." The token is "thanks;" the context includes the English-speaking couple handing her a dime. Another couple walks up, speaking German, and they too hand her a dime. Wanting to thank them as she thanked the couple before, she raises a different sign: "Danke." The token is different because the context is different as well. To do the same thing requires doing something different.
The point applies more generally. A diplomat is sent by her prime minister to offer another government "greetings." She is told to be polite; so after her meal in Iraq," 9 she belches loudly. The next day, dining with the British Monarch, she wants to do as she had done before-namely, be polite. Therefore she bows graciously upon leaving. Once again, to do the same thing requires doing something different.
Both examples rehearse the obvious. But the point is equally valid in a less obvious context. A Workers' Compensation statute, written in 1901, sets the compensation for an injured finger at $25. A worker injures her finger; a court awards $25. In 1989, faced with another similar loss, the court awards $2,500. It reasons as follows: To do the same thing in this new context, it must award something other than $25. By awarding $25, the meaning of the award would be changed-again, because the context is so drastically different. The court, therefore, changes the token to compensate for the change in context."
In each of these cases, the token is transformed to keep the meaning the same-a process we can label translation. Where meaning is not preserved, either because of a change in the context or token, the transformation effects an alteration. Transformations, therefore, are not all alike: Only some alter the meaning of the token transformed, while others translate the old meaning into a new context. 81 to fit ideas that have never occurred to them. Ownership meant no more to them than to roam the land as a great common. 81. The notion of translation is not new to law. Consider, for example, Justice Jackson's opinion in Board of Educ. v. Barnette, True, the task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-confidence. These principles grew in soil which also produced a philosophy that the individual was the center of society, that his liberty was attainable through mere absence of governmental restraints, and
This distinction between translation and alteration is critical to questions of democratic control. For if democratic endorsement tracks meaning rather than mere tokens or words, 2 then a transformation that preserves the meaning of a democratically-endorsed token likewise preserves the democratic endorsement, while a transformation that alters the meaning destroys the endorsement. 8 3
Only alteration, then, raises issues of democratic control; there is no reason, on democratic grounds, 8 " to oppose either translation or the plasticity that promotes translation. Translators can be plastic, and, since preserving of democratic control, democrats should insist upon it.
Whether we should accept Unger's exhortation to plastify, therefore, that government should be entrusted with few controls and only the mildest supervision over men's affairs. We must transplant these rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or principle of non-interference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls. 83. The fact that the endorsement of a token is transmitted says nothing about whether the meaning of the token still commands the support of a majority of the populace, which could very well have changed its mind. This Note assumes that a democratically-derived endorsement remains until removed, and that the mere shift in background conditions, requiring a translation, is not sufficient to effect a removal. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (discussing constitutions) ("Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually . . ").
84. There may be institutional reasons to resist plasticity in translation, such as stare decisis, but these are beyond the scope of this Note. See CALABRESI will turn upon the kind of transformation at issue-whether in context he promotes translation or alteration of democratically endorsed meaning.
B. Unger's Rhetoric of Transformation
Social life, Unger suggests, can be described by models of association, 5 each comprised of "a group of ideals, . . . a set of practices that . . . stand for these ideals in fact; and an area of social experience to which the application of these principles remains confined."" 6 Using the terms of this Note, we can consider the area of social experience as the context, the practices or institutions as tokens, and the ideals as the meanings of the tokens within their context. A change in either the practice or the area of social experience can result in a change in the meaning or ideals of the model.
Unger's Rhetoric of Alteration
One kind of transformation urged by Unger is alteration: The practices of one model of association are applied in an area of social experience from which they were previously excluded, so as to change the ideals governing this area of social experience."' The practices of democracy-equal franchise and majority voting, for example-are extended to the social experience of worker/management relations; the practices of the family are applied in the context of community relations. 8 " In both cases, the purpose of the application is to change the ideals within the new area of experience. When such applications succeed, the transformation is an alteration.
Unger's Rhetoric of Translation
However, the rhetoric of alteration is neither Unger's exclusive nor dominant rhetoric of transformation. Transformative action can change either the ideals or the practices, 9 but between the two, "attack[s] on the ideals that inspire . . . a particular view of life" are the rarest. 90 More often attacks are made upon the coherence of the practices of the model of 85. FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 101 ("Every extended practice of application of law demands recourse to tacit models of human association. The lawyer clears up the ambiguities of legal materials by referring to the basic principles that help organize and elucidate whole bodies of law.").
Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
87. " [W] hat began as a mere extension of familiar ideals into untried territory forces us in the end to refine and revise the ideal conceptions of human associations with which we had started." FALSE NEcEssiTy, supra note 3, at 105.
88. See, e.g., id. at 228 (discussing institutional changes to market economy to bring about petty commodity production).
89. "In each instance, the available options appeared to combine an abstract, indeterminate idea-of democratic rule, market decentralization, or technical coordination-with a concrete set of institutions that developed the idea in some directions rather than in others." SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 48. 90. FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 104. association, for it is here that "[m]ore often, the fit . . . comes apart." 91 Where once the ideals and the practices cohered, they no longer do, and unless either the ideals or the practices are transformed, the pre-existing meaning will be lost. 9 2 "[T]he perpetuation of [the practice] restrains the realization of its defining ideals . . . ."" A "partial adjustment[]" 94 is required, responding to "changes in circumstances" ' 9 5 to restore the model to its original purpose. This is no longer the rhetoric of alteration. Indeed, the process Unger describes here is a paradigmatic example of translation. A token (here an institution or practice) is changed to adjust for a change in the context (changed circumstances) so as to maintain its meaning (ideals). The transformation effects a translation: Rather than altering, translation preserves meaning from one context to another. To the extent this occurs "more often," to the extent Unger argues for "partial adjustments," and to the extent such partiality is required for stability," Unger's transformations manifest the rhetoric of translation. 
").
Instability is risked only when cultures divide over abstract ideals; when the "conflicting partisan visions get translated into the detailed schemes of collective life," id. at 280, however, the risk of wildly divergent views is erased.
97. Many of the ideas Unger articulates in describing a constitutional democracy are understandable as translations of 18th Century counterparts into 20th Century circumstances. See FALSE NECESsrrY, supra note 3, at 456-57 (discussing principles governing conflict of powers); id. at 227 ("The constitutional techniques for limiting government power must not be restricted to the armory of eighteenth-century institutional devices that control government only by disabling it from ambitious reform."); id. at 449 (increased Madisonian conflict necessary to translate checks and balances to modern activist state.).
98. Unger's critique of "false necessity," see supra text accompanying notes 33-35, as an explanation of the rigidity in democratic politics is particularly useful. To the extent this rigidity rests upon "superstition," SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 4, and this superstition explains an unwillingness to translate, the critique is useful even to one who wants no alteration of existing structures at all. Cf FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 305 ("It is true that you do not need to share an allegiance to the radical project in order to evaluate or even accept these descriptive and explanatory ideas.").
99. See supra note 81.
the democratic endorsement of the tokens it transforms,"' and therefore cannot be rejected on democratic grounds."' Accordingly, Ackerman does not resist translations of Article V, even though the transformation of the amending procedure was not itself democratically-endorsed. More generally, neither should he resist transformations that translate, or structures that foster such translation.
Plasticity and Alteration
Plasticity in alteration raises other concerns; among them Ackerman's apprehensions for democratic control. A democracy must assure that changes reflect a democratic will; plasticity's failure to provide such an assurance. 1 . drives Ackerman to promote dualism. Ackerman apparently conditions plasticity, while Unger apparently does not." 4 If the dispute between Ackerman and Unger distills to a dispute over the reach of plasticity in alteration, then it is not clear that wide disagreement remains. Unger's injunction to plastify is never unconditional."' Plasticity is limited by pragmatic, prudential concerns. One reading of these concerns might well support dualism's limitations in the context of constitutional commitments.
Unger offers two express limitations on plasticity. One limitation is poverty; where poverty exists, plasticity may be deferred." 6 But poverty is a wider concept than mere economic deprivation, and it is an analogous poverty-political poverty-that leads Ackerman to dualism. Like economic poverty, political poverty diverts democrats from the affairs of the state. A politically impoverished nation must erect mechanisms to assure that any fundamental change gains the attention of the people. Whatever its cause, poverty, whether economic or political, must limit the scope of plasticity in alteration.
Unger's second limit upon plasticity, however, in the realm of personal
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 98: 1173 crossed. On democratic grounds, Ackerman has no reason to refuse plasticity in translation; on grounds internal to his own argument, Unger may have reason to limit plasticity in alteration in the constitutional context. By distinguishing the sense of transformation that is the focus of each, the gap dividing them has been diminished, even if not completely closed. Differences in attitude remain, and these differences are not easily catalogued. Rather than attempting such an index, this Note offers a different reading of the radical rhetoric of the intellectual father of Critical Legal Studies. This reading suggests not only that there is more to plasticity than may at first appear, but also that plasticity is less radical than is so often claimed. Plasticity may help preserve constitutional meaning in the face of contextual change, and, when employed to effect constitutional change, nothing requires that it be unlimited.
In this way, plasticity may be less radical than some would suggest; but in speaking less radically, it perhaps says something more.
